From SC Magazine:
Visa announced on Friday that it has removed Heartland Payment Systems and RBS WorldPay — two payment processors that have announced massive data breaches in recent months — from its list of service providers compliant with payment industry guidelines.
“That could be a pretty significant event because retailers are obligated to use PCI compliant service providers,” Avivah Litan, a distinguished analyst at Gartner, told SCMagazineUS.com on Friday. “It’s almost like saying all their customers have to leave them.”
And then:
Rich Mogull, founder of IT security consultancy Securosis, said in an email Friday to SCMagazineUS.com that the PCI assessment process needs revamping.
“What we see is that although no PCI-compliant company seems to ever get breached, many are certified and then found non-compliant after the breach,” he said. “Thus, it’s clear the certification process is flawed. While I don’t expect certification to impart immunity from attack, decertifying all these companies seems disingenuous.”
This raises an interesting point: can a company be both compliant and non-compliant at the same time. I think this can be. It depends on how you measure.
I have no background on the PCI standard, but I suspect there may be different places where measurements can differ from one audit to another. The external auditor is likely paid by the company, and therefore has an interest in proving that the company is compliant. The VISA auditors after the security breach have the exact opposite incentive. Their goal is to prove the vendors non-compliant in order to prove the validity of the standard. For this reason, I almost guarantee that most hacked vendors will prove non-compliant PCI after hacked.
However, I don’t want to move the spotlight from Heartland Payment System who allowed themselves to still be breached. It’s quite possible that compliance didn’t last past the PCI audit. According to SC Magazine, hackers infiltrated the network soon after Heartland’s April 2008 PCI audit. It begs the question: how immune are audits like PCI to snapshot compliance? Can a company become compliant only when audits are performed? This is what Visa’s top risk officer, Ellen Richey, says about Heartland as quoted in SC Magazine:
“I’m sure everyone in this room has read the headlines questioning how an event of this magnitude could still happen today,” she said, according to a transcript of her speech. “The fact is, it never should have…As we’ve all read, [Heartland] had validated PCI compliance. But it was the lack of ongoing vigilance in maintaining compliance that left the company vulnerable to attack.” (Italics mine)
Finally, there is some argument that the PCI standard itself created this problem. There seems to be some noise on forums that assert that the PCI standard does not require end-to-end encryption. I’m not sure if this is true, but if it is, this means the implicit security standard at Heartland could have been “don’t worry, be crappy.” If this is the case, then may have just followed the PCI standard enough to get certified, but not enough to actually mitigate risk.